A fully abstract compilation scheme prevents the security features of the high-level language from being bypassed by an attacker operating at a particular lower level. This paper presents a fully abstract compilation scheme from a realistic object-oriented language with dynamic memory allocation, cross-package inheritance, exceptions and inner classes to untyped machine code. Full abstraction of the compilation scheme relies on enhancing the low-level machine model with a fine-grained, program counter-based memory access control mechanism. This paper contains the outline of a formal proof of full abstraction of the compilation scheme. Measurements of the overhead introduced by the compilation scheme indicate that it is negligible. Abstract. A fully abstract compilation scheme prevents the security features of the high-level language from being bypassed by an attacker operating at a particular lower level. This paper presents a fully abstract compilation scheme from a realistic object-oriented language with dynamic memory allocation, cross-package inheritance, exceptions and inner classes to untyped machine code. Full abstraction of the compilation scheme relies on enhancing the low-level machine model with a fine-grained, program counter-based memory access control mechanism. This paper contains the outline of a formal proof of full abstraction of the compilation scheme. Measurements of the overhead introduced by the compilation scheme indicate that it is negligible.
Introduction
Modern high-level languages such as ML, Java or Scala offer security features to programmers in the form of type systems, module systems, or encapsulation primitives. These mechanisms can be used as security building blocks to withstand the threat of attackers acting at the high level. For the software to be secure, attackers acting at lower levels need to be considered as well. Thus it is important that high-level security properties are preserved after the high-level code is compiled to machine code. Such a secrecy-preserving compilation scheme is called fully abstract [1] . An implication of such a compilation scheme is that the power of a low-level attacker is reduced to that of a high-level one. The notion of fully abstract compilation is well suited for expressing the preservation of security policies through compilation, as it preserves and reflects contextual equivalence. Two programs are contextually equivalent if they cannot be distinguished by a third one. Contextual equivalence models security policies as follows: saying that variable f of program C is confidential is equivalent to saying that C is contextually equivalent to any program C that differs from C in its value for f . A fully abstract compilation scheme does not eliminate high-level security flaws. It is, in a sense, conservative, introducing no more vulnerabilities at the low level than the ones already exploitable at the high level.
Fully abstract compilation of modern high-level languages is hard to achieve. Compilation of Java to JVM or of C # to the .NET framework [12] are some of the examples where compilation is not fully abstract. Recent techniques that achieve fully abstract compilation rely on address space layout randomisation [2, 9] , typebased invariants [4, 7] , and enhancing the low-level machine model with a finegrained program counter-based memory access control mechanism [3] .
The threat model considered in this paper is that of an attacker with lowlevel code execution privileges. Such an attacker can inject and execute malicious code at machine level and violate the security properties of the machine code generated by the compiler. In order to withstand such a low-level attacker, high-level security features must be preserved in the code generated during compilation. Agten et al. [3] were the first to show that fully abstract compilation of a safe high-level programming language to untyped machine code is possible. They achieved this by enhancing the low-level machine model with a fine-grained program counter-based memory access control mechanism inspired by existing systems [14, 15, 17, 20, 21] and recent industrial prototypes [16] . One limitation of the work of Agten et al. is that it only considers a toy high-level language. The main contribution of this paper is showing how essential programming language features can be securely compiled to the same low-level machine model of Agten et al. The adopted low-level model is similar to a modern processor, so the compilation scheme handles subtleties such as flags and registers that an implementation would have to face. More precisely, this paper makes the following contributions:
-a secure compilation scheme from a model object-oriented language with dynamic memory allocation, cross-package inheritance, exceptions and inner classes to low-level, untyped machine code; -the outline of a formal proof of full abstraction for this compilation scheme; -measurements of the run-time overhead introduced by the compilation scheme.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces background notions. Section 3 presents a secure compilation scheme for a language with dynamic memory allocation, cross-package inheritance, exceptions and inner classes. Section 4 outlines the proof of full abstraction of the compilation scheme. Section 5 presents benchmarks of the overhead introduced by the compilation scheme. Section 6 discusses limitations of the compilation scheme. Section 7 presents related work. Section 8 discusses future work and concludes.
Background
This section describes the low-level protection mechanism and the secure compilation scheme of Agten et al. [3] , which is the starting point of this paper. Then the high-level language targeted by the compilation scheme is presented.
Low-level Model
To model a realistic compilation scheme, the targeted low-level language should be close to what is used by modern processors. For this reason this paper adopts a low-level language that models a standard Von Neumann machine consisting of a program counter, a registers file, a flags register and memory space [3] .
In order to support full abstraction of the compilation scheme, the lowlevel language is enhanced with a protection mechanism: a fine-grained, program counter-based memory access control mechanism inspired by existing systems [14, 15, 17, 20, 21] and recent industrial prototypes [16] . We review this addition from the work of Agten et al. [3] and Strackx and Piessens [21] . This mechanism assumes that the memory is logically divided into a protected and an unprotected section. The protected section is further divided into a code and a data section. The code section contains a variable number of entry points: the only addresses to which instructions in unprotected memory can jump and execute. The data section is accessible only from the protected section. The size and location of each memory section are specified in a memory descriptor. The table below summarises the access control model enforced by the protection mechanism.
From\ To
Protected Unprotected Entry Point Code Data Protected r x r x r w r w x Unprotected x r w x
This protection mechanism provides a secure environment for code that needs to be protected from a potentially malicious surrounding environment. It is appealing in the context of embedded systems, where kernel-level protection mechanisms are often lacking. Details of the low-level language are omitted for space reasons, the reader can find them in the appendices.
A Secure Compiler for a Simple Language
Agten et al. [3] presented a secure (fully abstract) compilation scheme for a simple object based language. In an effort to be self-contained, this paper summarises their key points.
General notions. In the work of Agten et al., programs consist of a single object with fields and methods declarations which are compiled to the protected memory partition. Compiled programs must be indistinguishable from the size point of view, thus a constant amount of space is reserved for each program, independent of its implementation. All methods and fields are sorted alphabetically. Thus equivalent compiled programs cannot be distinguished based on the ordering of low-level method calls. Methods and fields are given a unique index, starting from 0, based on their order of occurrence. Those indexes serve as the offset used to access methods and fields. Parameters and local variables are also given method-local indexes to be used as above.
Registers r 0 to r 3 are used as working registers for low-level instructions and registers r 4 to r 11 are used for parameters. The call stack is split into a protected and an unprotected part, the former is allocated in the protected memory partition. A shadow stack pointer that points to the base of the protected stack is introduced to implement stack switches. When entering the protected memory, the protected stack is set as the active one; when leaving it, the unprotected stack is set to be the active one. To prevent tampering with the control flow, the base of the protected stack points to a procedure that writes 0 in r 0 and halts. For each method, a prologue and an epilogue are appended to the method body. They allocate and deallocate activation records on the secure stack, The program counter is initialised to a given address in unprotected memory. Entry points. For each method, an entry point in protected memory is created. Additionally, in order to enable returnbacks (returns from callbacks, which are calls to external code), a returnback entry point is created. Entry points act as proxies to the actual method implementations and are extended with security routines and checks.
These security routines reset unused registers and flags when leaving the protected memory to prevent them conveying unwanted information. For example, a callback to a function with two arguments resets all registers but r 4 and r 5 since they are the only ones that carry desired information. Checks are made to ensure that primitive-typed parameters have the right byte representation, e.g. Unit-typed parameters must have value 0, the chosen value of Unit type.
High-level Language
The high-level language targeted by this paper is Jeffrey and Rathke's Java Jr. [11] . Java Jr. is a strongly-typed, single-threaded, component-based, object-oriented language that enforces private fields and public methods. Java Jr. supports all the basic constructs one expects from a modern programming language, including dynamic memory allocation. A program in Java Jr., called a component, is a collection of sealed packages that communicate via interfaces and public objects. Java Jr. enforces a partition of packages into import and export ones. Import packages are analogous to the .h header file of a C program; they define interfaces and externs, which are references to externally defined objects. Export packages define classes and objects; they provide an implementation of an import package. Listing 1.1 illustrates the package system of Java Jr. Listing 1.1 contains two package declarations: PI is an import package and PE is an export package implementing PI. Object extAccount allocated in PE provides an implementation for the extern with the same name defined in PI. In Java Jr., primitive values, types and operations on them are assumed to be provided by a System package, whose name is omitted for the sake of brevity. The only primitive type is Unit, inhabited by unit. Since the focus of this paper is security, we write access modifiers for methods and fields even though the syntax of Java Jr. does not require them.
The security mechanism of Java Jr. is given by private fields. In Java Jr., classes are private to the package that contains their declarations. Objects are allocated in the same package as the class they instantiate. Due to this package system, for a package to be compiled it only needs the import packages of any package it depends on. As a result, formal parameters in methods have interface types, since classes that implement those interfaces are unknown. Additionally, since constructors are not exposed in interfaces, cross-package object allocation must be through factory methods. For example, the name of class AccountClass from Listing 1.1 is not visible from outside package PE, thus expressions of the form new PE.AccountClass() cannot be written outside PE. Java Jr. was chosen since it provides a clear notion of encapsulation for a highlevel component, which makes for simpler reasoning about the secure compilation scheme. This allows us to pinpoint what the key insights are to achieve secure (fully abstract) compilation, so that they can be used when the language is extended with cross-package inheritance, exceptions and inner classes.
3 Secure Compilation of Java Jr.
After a series of examples describing possible attacks on a naïve compilation scheme, this section describes what is needed in order to provide a secure compiler for Java Jr., starting from the secure compiler described in Section 2.2, and extend it to support cross-package inheritance, exceptions and inner classes.
The following examples use some standard assumptions about how objects are compiled [6] . When an object is allocated, a word is reserved to indicate its class, which is used to dynamically dispatch methods. Fields are accessed via offsets and methods are dispatched based on offsets. The key cannot be leaked at the high level, since high-level programs are strongly typed, but it can be leaked to low-level programs. A low-level, external program can perform a call to method getFirst() on an object of type Caesar; this will return the key field, since fields are accessed by offset. As low-level code is untyped, nothing prevents this attack from happening. Example 3 (Leakage of object references) Object references at the low-level are the address where objects are allocated. The attacker can call methods on objects it does not know of by guessing the address where an object is allocated. Passing object addresses from a secure program to an external one can also give away the allocation strategy of the compiler, as well as the size of allocated objects. An attacker that learns this information can then use it to mount attacks such as those presented in Example 1 and 2. From a technical point of view this means that leaking object addresses and accepting guessed addresses breaks full abstraction of the compilation scheme.
A Secure Compiler for Java Jr.
Before proposing countermeasures to the attacks just listed, this section lists the modifications to the scheme of Section 2.2 that are needed in order to support compilation of Java Jr. and, more generally, of object-oriented programs. Compilation of OO Languages. Fig. 1 shows a graphical representation of the protected memory section which is generated when securely compiling a Java Jr. component. Only a single protected memory section is needed, and all classes, objects and methods defined in the component are placed there. The protected code section contains entry points, described in Section 3.1 below, method body implementations, the procedure for object allocation and the dynamic dispatch. The protected data section contains the v-tables, support data structures, a secure stack and a secure heap. The v-tables are data structures used to perform the dynamic dispatch of method calls; they associate the address of the method to be executed on an object based on its type and the method name. Data structures are defined in Section 3.1 and 3.3.
In order to specify how the component interacts with external code, assume the component being compiled provides one import package without a corresponding export one. Refer to this package as the distinguished import package (DIP). The DIP contains interface and extern definitions, thus callbacks are calls on methods defined in the DIP. Component code is assumed not to implement interfaces defined in the DIP, while external code which provides an implementation for the DIP can also implement interfaces defined in the component. Assuming the calling convention with the outer world is known, dynamic dispatch can easily take care of external objects whose classes implement interfaces defined in the component. Method call implementation adopted by external code is more complex since function calls must jump to the correct entry point, but it still can be achieved for example using object wrappers.
Finally, register r 4 is used to identify the current object (this) in a method call at the low level. Before a callback, r 4 is stored in the secure stack so as to be able to restore this to the right value once the callback returns.
Securing the Compilation. Following are the countermeasures added to withstand the attacks described in the Examples above. Since the countermeasure to Example 3 affects the others, it is presented first.
Object identity. To mask low-level object identities, a data structure O is added to the data structures of Fig. 1 . It is a map between low-level object identities that have been passed to external code and natural numbers. Such object identities that are passed to external code are added to O right before they are passed outside. The index in the data structure is then passed in place of the object identity, the same index must be passed whenever an already recorded object is passed. Indices in O are thus passed in a deterministic order, based on the interaction between external and internal code. Code at entry points is responsible for retrieving object identities from O before the actual method call. As the only objects in the data structures are the ones the attacker knows, it cannot guess object identities.
Entry points. To support programming to an interface, the compilation scheme creates method entry points in protected memory for all interface-declared methods. A single returnback entry point for returning after a callback is also needed. ically divided in two parts. The first part performs the checks described in the previous paragraph and then jumps either to the code that performs the dynamic dispatch or to the callback. The second part returns control to the location from which the entry point was called; call this the exit point for method entry points and re-entry point for the returnback entry point. For method calls to be welltyped, the code at entry points performs dynamic typechecks. This checks that a method is invoked on objects of the right type (line 2), with parameters of the right type (line 4). Similar checks are executed when returning from a callback, in the returnback entry point (line f). These checks are performed only on objects whose class is defined in the compiled component, as they are allocated in protected memory; no control over externally allocated objects can be assumed. [7] .
Insights. Following are the insights that we gained from developing a secure compilation scheme for Java Jr.; they will be useful when extending the language in the following sections.
-Internal objects that are passed to external code must be remembered; their address must be masked. -Strong typing of methods must be enforced with additional runtime checks.
-The low-level code must not introduce additional functionality (low-level functions in entry points) that is not available at the high level.
Secure Compilation of Cross-package Inheritance
Cross-package inheritance arises whenever class D from an export package PSUB extends class C from a different export package PSUP, as in Listing 1.2. Crosspackage inheritance is not provided by Java Jr., as it would break the main result proven in the Java Jr. paper [11] . In order to allow cross-package inheritance, classes that can be extended must appear in import packages. Thus, given an import package, entry points are created not only for interface-defined methods, but also for class-defined ones and for constructors. Class D can optionally over- If the normal compilation scheme were followed, at the low-level d is allocated to a single memory area where fields from subobjects C and D are both allocated. Example 4 highlights the problems that arise in this setting. The problems just presented above also arise when C is not protected but D is, thus compilation of cross-package inheritance cannot be achieved normally.
To overcome these difficulties, when d is allocated, it is split in two subobjects: dc, with fields of class C, and dd, with fields of class D; the object identity of d is dd [22] .
Consider firstly the case when C is protected and D is not. External code needs to compile the expression d = new D() so that it calls new C() to create object dc in the protected memory section. External code must then save the resulting identifier for dc to perform super calls, since they are translated as method calls. The additional checks inserted at entry points presented in Section 3.1 ensure that super calls are always well-typed.
Consider then the case when C is not protected and D is. The secure compiler needs to call new D() and save the returned object identity for dd in a memory location, since super calls in this case are compiled as callbacks. When expression d = new D() is compiled, the unprotected address dc is stored at the low-level, right after the type of dd. The expression super.m() is compiled as dc.m().
The creation of two separate objects may seem to break full abstraction of the compilation scheme in a way similar to what Abadi found out for inner classes [1] . In fact, low level external code is given the functionality to call dc.m(), which is not explicitly possible in the high-level language. However, d.super.m() is an implicit call to the m() method of C, functionality that the high-level language already has. Handling of cross-package inheritance does not add functionality at the low level, so it does not break full abstraction of the compilation scheme.
Exceptions
Secure compilation of languages supporting exceptions must handle the difficulties that result from the modification of the flow of execution of a program. Exception handling can be securely implemented by modifying the runtime of the language so that it knows where to dispatch a thrown exception. Activation records are responsible for pointing to the exception handlers in order to propagate a thrown exception to the right handler. In Listing 1.3, the catch block of method m() in class G defines a handler for exceptions of type MyException. When the activation record for m() is allocated, the handler is registered. When an exception of type MyException is thrown, the stack is traversed to find the closest handler for exceptions of type MyException. As activation records are traversed and a handler is not found, those records are popped from the stack.
In the context of secure compilation, exception handlers are compiled in the usual manner. In order to implement throwing an exception in secure code that is caught in insecure code (or vice versa), throwing is compiled as callbacks (or calls). Thus two additional entry points are created: the throw entry point and the throwback entry point. These entry point forward calls to the secure and insecure exception dispatchers, respectively. The secure exception dispatcher traverses the secure stack looking for handlers for the thrown exception. After an activation record has been inspected and deallocated, the exception is forwarded to the external code through the throwback entry point. In order to prevent exploits similar to those of Example 2, the throwback entry point must remember internally allocated exceptions that are thrown to external code. So, a data structure E, similar to O, is created to register leaked exceptions. This prevents external code from passing a fake object identity to the secure exception handler in place of the object identity of an exception, effectively throwing a non existent exception. External code can implement a wrapper around the exception object identity in order to be able to associate it to its type and then be able to recognise the type of the exception in the handler. Full abstraction of the compilation scheme is preserved since the low-level is not extended with functionality that the high-level lacks. Only exceptions of existing type can be thrown and handling exceptions follows the normal course of the stack. The external code could replace an exception with a fake one, but this is equivalent to the high-level language functionality to catching an exception and throwing another one. Thus the low-level is not granted additional functionality.
Secure Compilation of Inner Classes
Inner classes are classes that are defined inside another class, as in Listing 1.4. Inner classes have access to private fields of the class they are defined within. Inner classes of the secure component are compiled as normal classes in the protected memory partition, in the usual fashion. To implement access from the inner class to the private fields of the surrounding class, a getter and a setter for each of its private fields are created. In the case of Listing 1.4, class AccountClass is extended with getters and setters for the counter field when compiled. Access from Inner to counter is compiled as method calls via the getter and setter.
This approach is inspired by Abadi [1] , who shows that it breaks full abstraction of compilation in an early version of the JVM. In that setting, the additional low-level methods are not available at the high level, thus other low-level code other than the inner classes can call those methods, achieving something that was not possible at the high level. In our secure compilation scheme, the additional methods are available in the surrounding class. However the additional methods are not made available through entry points, thus the external code cannot invoke them. This means that the addition of inner classes to the secure compilation scheme preserves the full abstraction property.
Full Abstraction of the Compilation Scheme
This section presents an outline of the proof of full abstraction of the compilation scheme of Section 3. As mentioned in Section 1, a fully abstract compilation scheme preserves and reflects contextual equivalence of high-and low-level programs. This paper does not argue about the choice of contextual equivalence for modelling security properties. This is treated in other relevant literature [1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 12] .
Informally speaking, two programs C 1 and C 2 are contextually equivalent if they behave the same for all possible evaluation contexts they interact with. An evaluation context C can be thought of as a larger program with a hole. If the hole is filled either with C 1 or C 2 , the behaviour of the whole program does not vary. Formally, contextual equivalence is defined as:
where ⇑ denotes divergence [19] .
Denote the result of compiling a component C as C
↓
. Full abstraction of the compilation scheme is formally expressed as:
C 2 states that the compiler outputs low-level programs that behave as the corresponding source programs. This is what most compilers achieve, at times even certifying the result [5, 13] ; we are not interested in this direction. This is thus assumed, the consequences of this assumption are made explicit (Assumption 1 below). The direction
states that high-level properties are preserved through compilation to the low level. Proving this direction requires reasoning about contexts, which is notoriously difficult [4] . This is even more so in this setting, where low-level contexts are memories lacking any inductive structure. To avoid working with contexts, we equip the low-level language with a trace semantics that is equivalent to its operational semantics [18] (Proposition 1 below) and prove the contrapositive:
This proof is based on an algorithm that creates a high-level component, a "witness" that differentiates C 1 from C 2 , given that they have different low-level traces α 1 and α 2 . This proof strategy is known [3, 10] , its complexity resides in handling features of the high-level language such as typing or dynamic memory allocation.
This proof, as well as the formalisation of Java Jr. and the assembly language, are omitted for space constraints. The interested reader can find them in the appendices. To further support the validity of this proof, the algorithm has been implemented in Scala, and it outputs Java components that adhere to the Java Jr. formalisation. 
Assumption 1 (Compiler preserves behaviour)
The compiler is assumed to output low-level programs that behave as the corresponding input program. Thus a high-level expression is translated into a list of low-level instructions that preserve the behaviour. By this, we mean that the following properties hold:
-There exists an equivalence relation between high-level states and low-level states, such that:
• The initial high-and low-level states are equivalent.
• Given two equivalent states and two corresponding internal transitions, the states these transitions lead to are equivalent. Moreover, given two equivalent states and two equivalent actions, the states these transitions lead to are equivalent.
Proposition 1 (Trace semantics is equivalent to operational semantics [18] ). For any two low-level components C ↓ 1 and C ↓ 2 obtained from compiling Java Jr. components C 1 and C 2 with the secure compilation scheme, we have that:
Theorem 1 (Differentiation of components). Any two high-level components C 1 and C 2 that exhibit two different low-level traces α 1 and α 2 are not contextually equivalent. Formally:
Theorem 2 (Full abstraction of the compilation scheme). For any two high-level components C 1 and C 2 , we have (assuming there is no overflow of the secure stack or of the secure heap):
Benchmarks
This section presents benchmarking of the overhead of the secure compiler, which is proportional to the amount of boundaries crossing. As a target low-level architecture we chose Fides [3, 21] . The Fides architecture implements precisely the protection mechanism described in Section 2.1 in a very reduced TCB: ∼7000 lines of code. Fides consists of a hypervisor that runs two virtual machines: one handles the secure memory partition and one handles the other [21] . One consequence is that switching between the two virtual machines of Fides (performing calls and callbacks) is a costly operation.
For the benchmarks, we implemented a secure runtime in C. The secure runtime adds the checks presented in Section 3 to calls, callbacks (both with different number of parameters, ranging from one to eight), returns and returnbacks. These operations are executed on stub objects. A stub objects is a data structure that models the low-level representation of objects; it has an integer field that indicates the class of the object followed by the fields of the object. The secure runtime also contains the data structure O and functions that mask object references through it. Each operation was tested 1000 times on a MacBook Pro with a 2.3 GHz Intel Core i5 processor and 4GB 1333MHz DDR3 RAM. The overhead introduced for each operation ranged from 0.09% to 7.89%, averaging a 3.25% overhead. Details of the measurements are in the appendices.
Limitations
This section presents limitations of the compilation scheme of Section 3 and discusses garbage collection when part of the program is compiled securely.
Like many model languages [2, 9] , Java Jr. lacks features that real-world programming languages have, such as multithreading, foreign-function interfaces and garbage collection. A thorough investigation of the changes needed in order to support secure compilation of languages with those features is left for future work. Let us now informally discuss how garbage collection can be achieved in concert with a secure compiler.
Garbage collection is a runtime addition that handles whole programs. Firstly, assume that the external code is well-behaved and it does not disrupt the functionality of the garbage collector, such as by introducing fake pointers. To perform garbage collection when part of the whole program is securely compiled, a part of the garbage collector must be trusted and allocated in the protected memory partition so that it can access O. In this way the garbage collector can traverse the whole object graph and identify the location of a reference that is an index of O.
Assume now that external code can disrupt the functionality of the garbage collector. The classical notion of garbage collection becomes void. In this setting the securely compiled component can be extended with a secure memory manager in charge of the secure memory partition. Here, an arguable safe methodology is to not deallocate a reference that is passed from the secure component to external code, a fact that creates problems when the allocated object is large or when many objects are passed out. In order to provide a solution to part of the problem, the compiler can introduce leasing [8] ; this gives objects that are leaked a lifetime duration which, upon expiration, causes object deallocation. Alternatively, the caretaker pattern can be introduced. Instead of leaking an object reference o, the reference is wrapped in a proxy p (the caretaker) and the reference to p is leaked. In addition to method proxies for methods of o, p has a method to set the reference to o to null, allowing the secure memory manager to free o's memory. The problem that arises now is a breach in full abstraction: the caretaker pattern must be lifted to the high level to preserve full abstraction.
Related Work
This paper extends the work of Agten et al. [3] , where the same result is achieved, but for a simpler, object-based, high-level language. This work adopts an objectoriented language with dynamic object allocation, cross-package inheritance, exceptions and inner classes, which makes the result significantly harder to achieve.
Secure compilation through full abstraction was pioneered by Abadi [1] , where, alongside a result in the π-calculus setting, Java bytecode compilation in the early JVM is shown to expose methods used to access private fields by private inner classes. Kennedy [12] listed six full abstraction failures in the compilation to .NET, half of which have been fixed in modern C # implementations. Address space layout randomisation has been adopted by Abadi and Plotkin [2] and subsequently by Jagadeesan et al. [9] to guarantee probabilistic full abstraction of a compilation scheme. In both works the low-level language is more high-level than ours and the protection mechanism is different. Compilation does not necessarily need to target machine code, as Fournet et al. [7] show by providing a fully abstract compilation scheme from an ML dialect named F * to JavaScript that relies on type-based invariants. Similarly, Ahmed and Blume [4] prove full abstraction of a continuation-passing style translation from simply-typed λ-calculus to System F. In both works, the low-level language is typed and more high-level than ours. The checks introduced by our compilation scheme seem simpler than the checks of Fournet et al.
A large amount of work on secure compilation applies to unsafe languages such as C, as surveyed by Younan et al. [23] . That research is devoted to strengthening the run-time of C and not on fully abstract compilation.
A different area of research provides security architectures with fine-grained low-level protection mechanisms. Different security architectures with access control mechanisms comparable to ours have been developed in recent years: TrustVisor [14] , Flicker [15] , Nizza [20] , SPMs [17, 21] and the Intel SGX [16] . The existence of industrial prototypes underlines the feasibility of this approach to bringing efficient, secure, low-level memory access control in commodity hardware. No results comparable to ours were proven for these systems.
Conclusion and Future Work
This paper presented a fully abstract compilation scheme for a strongly-typed, single-threaded, component-based, object-oriented programming language with dynamic memory allocation, exceptions, cross-package inheritance and inner classes to untyped machine code enhanced with a low-level protection mechanism. Full abstraction of the compilation scheme is proven correct, guaranteeing preservation and reflection of contextual equivalence between high-level components and their compiled counterparts. From the security perspective this ensures that low-level attackers are restricted to the same capabilities high-level attackers have. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result of its kind for such an expressive high-level language and such a powerful low-level one.
Future work includes extending the results to a language with more real-world programming language features such as concurrency and distribution.
Introduction to Appendixes
Section A presents contextual equivalence as a good candidate to model security properties enforcement. Section B and Section C present the details of the formalisation of both Java Jr. and the low-level language. Section D presents examples for the algorithm mentioned in Section 4. Section E presents a transliteration of the pseudo code of the algorithm of Section 4. Section F presents the proofs of Section 4. Finally, Section G presents details of the benchmarking measurements.
A Contextual Equivalence: a Security Perspective
This section briefly motivates contextual equivalence as a good candidate for security policies enforcement. This notion is widely accepted in the field, it is only included in order to familiarise the reader with these concepts [1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 12] .
In Java Jr., fields are private, so every allocated object defines a secret state: the contents of its fields. Some objects can thus be indistinguishable from an external point of view even though their states differ; they are contextually equivalent, denoted as C 1 C 2 . Formally, for all contexts C with a hole, contextual equivalence is defined as follows:
where ⇑ denotes divergence [19] . Contexts in Java Jr. are components [11] .
Contextual equivalence can be adopted to state security properties such as confidentiality, integrity and invariant definition, as in Fig. 3 [2, 3] . Classes are annotated with subscripts for identification but their names are meant to be the same. Class C 1 and C 2 in Fig. 3 call to m1. If they are contextually equivalent then no program interacting with either of them can infer the value of secret. This is a confidentiality property. Additionally, C 1 checks whether changes to secret have been made during the call to arg.cb( ) in method m2. If C 1 and C 2 are contextually equivalent then the call to arg.cb( ) does not modify the value of secret, this is an integrity property. Finally, when min>max, method m3 of C 1 will return 1. If C 1 and C 2 are contextually equivalent then the invariant min ≤ max is never violated. This is an invariant definition property.
From the high-level language perspective, context equivalence holds for the presented examples. However, when these examples are run on a physical machine, they are compiled to machine code. As the machine code is not strongly typed and it allows jumps to all addresses in memory, an attacker with machine code injection privileges can violate the secrecy properties of these examples [23] .
B High-Level Language
This section formally presents the high-level language used herein: Java Jr. [11] alongside its syntax, static, dynamic and trace semantics. Most of the concepts are taken from the work of Jeffrey and Rathke [11] , with some corrections as to fill the missing bits of the formalisation.
B.1 Syntax
Assume the presence of an infinite set of package names P n ranged over by p, q, class and interfaces names C n ranged over by c, i, t, u, object names O n ranged over by o, field names F n ranged over by f, g, h, variable names V n ranged over by x, y, z and method names M n ranged over by m. Names in a package are always pairwise distinct. Integers, unit and other ground types are considered to be implemented in a System package, alongside operations on them. The root of the class hierarchy is indicated with Obj. Values of the language,denoted with v, are object identifiers p.o and ground-typed values such as Unit and natural numbers. The syntax of Java Jr. is presented in Fig. 4 .
B.2 Static Semantics
The static semantics defines typing relations based on the judgments of Fig. 5 . Adopt Γ as the standard type environment that binds variables to types, where variables cannot be repeated. Additionally, the component C is added to the typing environment to act as a reference to the standard class table. To preserve the encapsulation principle given by packages, types are annotated with package names; thus an expression does not simply have type t but type t in p. Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 present the typing rules as from the original Java Jr. work [11] . They are mostly standard, except for few modifications. Modifications were made to rules Declaration-class, Declaration-object, Declaration-interface and Method-Types to ensure the "programming to an interface" paradigm is enforced. Rules Expr-concat and Scope-all have been devised by the authors as they were not presented in the original paper.
Type soundness The type system enjoys the progress and preservation properties as proven in the original Java Jr. work [11] .
B.3 Dynamic Semantics
The dynamic semantics is given in terms of a relation (C E) → (C E ) that models the evolution of component C executing expression E to C executing E . The expression that is executed is immersed in an evaluation context E, which models the environment in which the evaluation takes place. The syntax of an evaluation context is:
Rules for reductions of the form (C E) → (C E ) are presented in Fig. 8 . 
B.4 Trace Semantics
As Section A presented, full abstraction between two entities is achieved by showing contextual equivalence of the involved entities. In this case, contexts C can be thought as components, the expression C[C] denoting the merging of two components C, C, more details can be found in [11] . The paper presenting Java Jr. [11] establishes a full abstraction result between contextual equivalence and trace semantics, denoted Traces H (C), making the two notions identical. Two well-typed components that have the same trace semantics are thus also contextually equivalent. Formally: if C 1 : cmp and C 2 : cmp then Traces H (C 1 ) = Traces H (C 2 ) ⇐⇒ C 1 C 2 Let us now define the details related to the trace semantics of Java Jr.
The trace semantics of a component C is a set of sequences of labels, actions that can be executed by C when interacting with another unknown piece of code. In this setting, labels are method calls and returns, possibly preceded by a number of binders that bind names of newly introduced objects.
Labels L that define actions are presented in Fig. 9 alongside the function for calculating free names in traces, τ is the internal silent action. Decorations ? and ! express the "direction" of the action: from the testing environment to the component under test or vice-versa.
Traces are sequences of a's: visible actions that are considered the same up to α-equivalence of newly defined names. Denote two α-equivalent traces a 1 , a 2 as a 1 ≡ α a 2 . Labels of the form new(v).g act as binders for v in g.
Following are the downcasting rules for imported (C + extern v : t;) and exported (C + object v : t;) names. These downcasting rules define how to C t : type in p t ∈ C.t.superTypes 
C; Γ E : u in p C; Γ, E : u in p E : t in p C; Γ E; E : t in p (Expr-coercion) C; Γ E : t in p C t : type in q C; Γ E in p : t in q (Expr-subsumption) C; Γ E : t in p C t <: u in p C; Γ E : u in p Fig. 7 . Java Jr. typing rules, part two.
implements t{F }} and C u <: t in p and t = Notice that the downcasting rules allow ground-typed variables to be treated as objects and externs simply via the first rule of each downcasting.
(Eval-method)
C.v = {package p; object o : t implements t{F }} public m(x : t) : t{return E; } ∈ C.t.mths 
Definition 1 (High-level state)
. The state of a high level component C, denoted Σ, is defined as follows:
where E is an expression of C, blk is a marker indicating that control is outside of C and E models the evaluation stack, every entry E i of E having a hole of type t i , yielding a result of type t i .
The state Σ models whether an external testing component is executing code (blk) or the component under test is executing (E). When blk is executing, it may call methods of the component which is being tested: C.
The relation Σ a =⇒ Σ is defined in Fig. 10 , it describes the sequence of actions a well-typed component can engage in. & new labels) . Consider the code presented in Listing 1.1, adopt C to refer to that code, the following is a trace it can generate.
An example that shows the usage of the stack E can be found in [11] .
C Low-Level Language
For the sake of completeness, the following section presents the low-level machine model. The reader is referred to [18] for a more thorough treatment of the formalisation of the low-level language.
C.1 Syntax
The low-level language is run on an architecture that models a Von Neumann machine consisting of a program counter p, a register file r, a flags register f and memory space m. The program counter indicates the address of the instruction that is executed. The register file contains 12 general purpose registers R 0 to R 11 and a stack pointer register SP, which contains the address of the top of the current call stack. The flags register contains a zero flag ZF and a sign flag SF, which are set or cleared by arithmetic instructions and are used by branching instructions. For the sake of simplicity, assume the architecture targeted by the language works with bit-long words, where is a power of 2. This allows the formalisation presented to scale to architectures with words of different sizes. Fig. 11 presents elements of the formalisation. Words w are either instructions i or sequences of bits 0 or 1 of length . Instructions i are elements of the set I and define the programming language executed on the architecture (Fig. 12) . The empty word 0 is a sequence of 0's whose length is based on the architecture being considered. Addresses a are natural numbers, ranging from 0 to 2 − 1. Memories m are maps from addresses to words. Memory access, denoted as m(a), is defined as follows: m(a) = w if a → w ∈ m; it is undefined otherwise. Define the domain of a memory as dom(m) = {a | a → w ∈ m}. If two memories m and m have disjoint domains, they can be merged in another memory. Formally, if movl rd rs Load the word from the memory address in register rs into register rd. movs rd rs Store the contents of register rs at the address found in register rd. movi rd k
Load the constant value k into register rd. Note that k < 2 . add rd rs
Write rd + rs mod 2 into register rd and set the ZF flag accordingly. sub rd rs
Write rd − rs mod 2 into register rd and set both the ZF and the SF flags accordingly. cmp r1 r2
Calculate r1 − r2 and set both the ZF and the SF flags accordingly.
jmp ri
Jump to the address located in register ri. je ri
If the ZF flag is set, jump to the address in register ri. jl ri
If the SF flag is set, jump to the address in register ri. call ri Push the value of the program counter onto the stack and jump to the address in register ri. ret Pop a value from the stack and jump to the popped location. halt Stop the execution with the result in register R0. 
Memory descriptors s are quadruples: (a b , n c , n d , n): a b is the address where the protected memory partition starts, n c and n d are the sizes (in number of addresses) of the code and data section respectively and n is the number of entry points. Entry points are allocated starting from the base address a b . Each entry point is N e words long. Assume the entry points do not overflow the protected code section, thus the constraint n·N e < n c holds for the all memory descriptors. Programs P are pairs of a memory m and a memory descriptor s.
C.2 Operational Semantics
Before introducing the semantics, a number of auxiliary notions are defined. Fig. 13 defines the access control enforcement rules. Read judgments s predicate(a, b, · · · ) as: "according to s, predicate holds for addresses a, b, · · · ".
Define functions m sec m,s and m ext m,s, which return the protected and unprotected parts of a memory m according to the descriptor s, respectively as: In the semantics there are two call stacks, one for the protected code, called the secure stack, and one for the unprotected code, called the insecure stack. Each stack is preceded by a word containing the location of the current head of the stack, let SP sec and SP ext indicate the address of the secure and insecure stack respectively. When the current stack is changed in the semantics, the stack pointer register SP is initialised to the right address using SP sec and SP ext . Given a memory descriptor s = (a b , n c , n d , n), the secure stack starts at the beginning of the protected data section and the insecure stack starts at the end of the protected memory partition. Thus SP sec = (a b + n c ) and, initially, SP sec → (a b + n c +1); analogously, SP ext = (a b +n c +n d ) and, initially, SP ext → (a b +n c +n d +1). Call and return instructions are responsible of setting the SP register to the correct address when crossing boundaries between protected and unprotected memory. The value of the program counter is pushed onto the stack by a call instruction (the stack grows down), while a ret instruction pops one address from the top of the stack and jumps to that location. Updating the stack pointer SP is performed by the auxiliary function setStack (Fig. 14) . In the rules, notation m[a → w] indicates that memory m is updated to a new one that is equal to m except that the value stored at address a is w. Notation r[R → w] indicates that the register file r is updated to a new one that is equal to r except that the value stored in register R is w. Notation r(R) indicates the value contained in register R in register file r. Given a jump between addresses p and The operational semantics is a small step semantics that describes how each instruction of the language transforms an execution state into a new one. Thus, the operational semantics handles programs in the whole memory: both the protected and unprotected partitions. entry point when returning from a callback. Code located at the returnback entry point must contain a ret instruction in order to correctly resume the execution. The compiler ensures that rule Eval − movs − out will never be executed and that unused registers and flags are always reset to 0 when crossing the boundary. The transitive closure of relation → → is indicated with → → * . A state Ω performing n reduction steps is indicated as Ω → → n Ω . The evaluation of program P is a sequence of steps that takes the initial state of P to another state. ; the result of the computation is stored in R 0 . If the evaluation of program P does not terminate, P diverges. A program P diverges, denoted as P ⇑ , if it executes an unbounded number of reduction steps. Formally: P⇑ if ∀n ∈ N, ∃Ω . Ω 0 (P ) → →
n Ω .
C.3 Trace Semantics
This section presents the trace semantics for protected, low-level programs.
As for the operational semantics, a notion of execution states is required for the trace semantics as well. Execution states, denoted as Θ, are the same as Ω except that Θ do not deal with the whole memory but just with its protected partition. So, the memory m of (p, r, f, m, s) spans only the protected memory partition indicated by s. Additionally, Θ can be (unknown, m, s), an unknown state that models when code is executing in unprotected memory [11] . Below are the labels exhibited by the traces semantics.
A label Λ can be either an observable action α or a non-observable action τ i . Action τ i indicates the unobservable action occurred in protected memory. Observable actions include a tick √ indicating that the evaluation has terminated.
Additionally, observable actions are function calls or returns to a certain address a, combined with the registers r and flags f . Registers and flags are in the labels as they convey information on the behaviour of programs. 
D Algorithm
This paper does not present a transliteration of the pseudo-code of the algorithm mentioned in Section 4, which would be difficult to understand. Instead, this section presents several examples of the expected output of the algorithm in different cases. The examples illustrate crucial cases the algorithm needs to consider when creating the output component.
The algorithm takes as input two low-level traces α 1 and α 2 and two components C 1 and C 2 . Traces α 1 and α 2 were generated by C For the algorithm to be correct, it should be able to detect when two different actions are encountered. Moreover, the code produced for high-level action a must be proven to generate low-level action α, where α is equivalent to a; this equivalence relation will be formalised in Definition 7 below. We do not provide a formal proof of the correctness of the algorithm, this fact can be seen from the following examples or by consulting the pseudo-code in the companion report. To further support this statement, the algorithm has been implemented in Scala, and it outputs Java components that adhere to the Java Jr. formalisation.
2
In the following, the adjective internal denotes objects (classes) that are allocated (defined) by components C 1 and C 2 . The adjective external denotes objects (classes) that are allocated (defined) by the output component.
General idea. The algorithm analyses actions in the low level traces α 1 and α 2 . Those actions can be of four types: call, return, callback, returnback. Actions that appear at even-numbered positions in a trace are calls or returnbacks, generated from the external memory. Actions that appear at odd-numbered positions are returns or callbacks, generated by C 1 or C 2 . This partitioning is because execution starts in unprotected memory.
Assuming the first different actions are at index i, the algorithm produces code that replicates the first i − 1 actions. Then, it produces code that, based on the difference in the i-th action, exits with value 1 or 2 based on which component it is interacting with. The output component is given the power to end the computation via the exit statement to avoid being trapped in infinite loops deriving from infinite traces.
Starting point. The algorithm starts by creating a knowledge base about C 1 and C 2 . The knowledge base contains all signatures of internally-and externallydefined methods, as well as high-and low-level identities of static objects and externs. This is because the algorithm needs to be able to differentiate, for example, whether a type is internally or externally defined, or what are the identities of static objects. Then, a code skeleton for the output component is created, based on the structure of the distinguished import package (DIP) of C 1 and C 2 .
For all interfaces i defined in the DIP, a class i _ c is created. An object staticFor _ i of type i _ c is then created. Classes i _ c contain dummy implementations of all methods defined in i and in all interfaces i extends. These method implementations return a value whose type matches the expected return type: 0 for type Int, unit for type Unit and null otherwise. A method called defaultCreate() is added to all classes i _ c, it is implemented as follows:
Methods defaultCreate() are responsible for allocating external objects, they will be called only on objects staticFor _ i. Constructors inside defaultCreate() are supplied standard values for their parameters: 0 for type Int, unit for type Unit and null otherwise. Since parameters cannot be accessed by external code, the value they are initialised to is not important. For the sake of simplicity, the following examples have constructors with no parameters.
The output component is extended with extra classes. Firstly, class Tester containing the main method is added; it is required for the execution to start. Other needed classes will be introduced and motivated by the following examples.
Code examples. The following examples present different implementations of C 1 , on the left, and of C 2 , on the right. Components C 1 and C 2 are modifications of the code in Listing 1.1, whose DIP is defined in Listing 1.5. Omitted code is the same in both C 1 and C 2 and can be found in Listing 1.1. Each code fragment is followed by the low-level trace it generates: α 1 and α 2 for C 1 and C 2 respectively. The examples also describe what the algorithm must do in order to create the correct output before presenting the output produced for each case.
The low-level traces will be massaged to aid understanding. For example, given that object extAccount is compiled to address 0x123 and that method createAccount is located at address 0x456, the low-level label call 0x456(0x123) is written as extAccount.createAccount(). Numbers in italic font, e.g. 1 , refer to indexes from O, while identities of externally allocated objects are numbers in hexadecimal. √ . In this example, the produced code needs to differentiate between C 1 and C 2 based on the type of expected returned values. These types can be either: primitive, internal, external. With primitive-typed values the differentiation is based on the different values returned by C 1 or C 2 , in this case 1 and 2 respectively. This example highlights how both the algorithm and the produced code need to keep track of the index of the action they replicate. To that end, the algorithm maintains a global variable. The produced code is extended with a class Helper and a static object oc implementing it. Helper contains a field step with methods getStep() and incrementStep(), the latter increases the value of step by one. As oc is static, its fields are global variables for the output component.
Example 2 (Different returned values
The algorithm outputs the following code in this example: The first actions generate the code in lines 2 to 6, thus it is wrapped in an ifstatement that makes the generated code take place only when the considered action is the first: e.g. step is 0. The second actions are the responsible for incrementing step in line 5. The third actions generate the code in lines 7 to 11, while the fourth actions, the different ones, generate the code in line 10.
The approach of this example is similar to what the algorithm does in case the difference in the traces is in primitive-typed parameters of a callback. In that case, instead of creating fresh variable varb, the produced code performs the differentiation by using the name of the parameter which has the different value.
Example 3 (Different method of a callback). To achieve differentiation in this case, the algorithm needs to keep track of in the current method, since it indicates where the differentiating code will be placed. The current method is recorded in a stack which is initially set to method main in class Tester. Callbacks indicate that the current method is changed to a new entry, returnback indicate that the current method is restored to a previous one. Thus, whenever a callback to method m of class c is performed, an entry of the form c.m is pushed on the stack. A returnback pops the head of the current method stack.
The algorithm outputs the following code in this example: Notice that the if-statements of lines 8 and 12, whose addition was discussed in Example 2, help the produced code achieve differentiation in this case as well. Should methods createTransaction() or lock() be called multiple times, the if-guard ensures that the differentiation only happens at the right time.
Example 4 (Different internally-typed returned object). To achieve differentiation in this case, the produced code needs to keep track of internally allocated objects. For this it relies on a list internals provided by oc. In order for internal objects to be accessible, they are wrapped with a new class: Internal that has two fields. The first, of type Object, contains a reference to an internal object. The second, name, can be used to filter the search for objects. No two objects with the same name can be added to internals. Elements of this list can be accessed via method getInternByName( n ), which returns the object with name n. Additionally, method getNameByObject( o ) returns the name of object o. The algorithm has a table with the low-level identities and the type of all dynamically-allocated objects in order to generate correct code when retrieving internals as in line 6 in the code below.
The algorithm outputs the following code in this example: Line 5 has no effect, since internals already has an entry for extAccount. In case C 1 and C 2 were swapped, line 5 would bind f to name 1 , ensuring the correctness of the call to getInternByName("1 ") in line 6.
This example scales to different internally-typed parameters in a callback. In such cases, the lookup method used is getNameByObject, and the differentiation is made on the names bound to different internally allocated objects that are passed as parameters in a callback.
Example 5 (Different callee of a callback). Trace α 1 is extAccount.createAccount()? extTrans1. createTransaction()! √ , while trace α 2 is extAccount. createAccount()? extTrans2.createTransaction()! √ . In this case the difference is the external object on which the second callback is performed. Here, C 1 calls createTransaction() on extTrans1, while C 2 calls it on extTrans2.
In order to achieve this differentiation, the produced code needs to keep track of external objects similarly to how it needed to keep track of internal objects in Example 4. All external objects must be bound to a name, just as the internally allocated ones are. For this purpose, a class Listable is created, all the classes i _ c extend Listable. Listable contains a name and a type field, with getters and setters. It also contains a method setAndRegister( n , t ), that sets name = n, type = t and adds the object to a list of Listable called externals that is kept in object oc. Object oc contains method getExternal( n , t ) to retrieve these objects based on name and type.
The algorithm outputs the following code in this example: √ . This example presents the expected output in case the difference is in a parameter of a callback. The produced code relies on the notions defined in Example 5, using the field name of external objects to achieve differentiation.
The algorithm outputs the following code in this example: When control is returned to main after a call to createAccount(), it means that the output component is interacting with C 2 . In this case the produced code terminates via the expression of line 5. Divergence is accomplished by C 1 .
Example 8 (Different callee of a callback #2). √ . In this case the difference is the external object on which a callback is performed. Here, C 1 calls createTransaction() on 0x6, while C 2 calls the same method on extTrans.
The following code is produced by the algorithm for this example: Lines 14 to 17 ensure that if an external object is not found in the list externals, it is allocated by calling to the default factory method and then added to externals. Fields name and type for external static objects are assumed to be initialised in the first instructions of the main. That code is omitted for brevity.
E Algorithm Transliteration
This section describes in words and pseudo-code the algorithm of Section 4. Recall that the algorithm takes in input two low-level traces α 1 and α 2 and two components C 1 and C 2 . Traces α 1 and α 2 are generated by C Class Listable will be extended by all classes implementing interfaces of the import package. Listable has two fields: name and type, getters and setters for them and a method setAndRegister(v,t) that sets name=v, type=t and adds the current object to the list of external objects in oc (defined below).
Class Intern provides a wrapper for internal objects and the low-level identifier corresponding to them. Intern has two fields, name and obj; the second is of type Object since it stores references to internal objects of all types.
Class Helper, and object oc implementing it, provide access to global variables. Helper has a step variable, which is used to keep track of how many actions have been evaluated. Helper also has field externals, a list of Listable where all external objects are stored. Similarly, it has field internals, a list of Intern where all internal objects are stored. Helper provides the following methods: addExtern and addIntern to add elements to internals and externals respectively; getInternByName to retrieve an internal object given its name; getNameByObj to retrieve an internal object's name given the object and getExtern to retrieve an external object given its name and type.
Finally, a Tester class is created, it contains the main method. The skeleton is then extended based on the import package defined by C 1 and C 2 . Listing 1.6 presents the skeleton code for the import package of Listing 1.5. For all interfaces i defined in the import package, a class named "i_c" is created. These classes extend Listable and implement i. These classes are accompanied by an object named "staticFor_i". Bodies of these classes are filled with dummy method implementation that return a value whose type matches the signature: unit and 0 for types Unit and Int respectively, or null otherwise. These method bodies will change during construction phase. A new method defaultCreate() is added, it is a factory method that returns new instances of the class when called from the static object related to the class. Objects are allocated with default values in the parameters of constructors, their state is not needed as it is mimicked by the code generated further on. Finally, for all externs, an object with the same name is created. Algorithm variables and data structures. Global variables used by the algorithm are indicated using an italic font. The counter i is used to count execution steps: each time the algorithm switches phase it increments i by one. The flag diff is used to capture that the differentiation has occurred and the algorithm can produce the output. The stack c.m of method invocations is used to keep track of what external methods m of class c are called; no information about the current package is needed since the testing component consists of a single package. The top of c.m, denoted m c , is referred to as the current method. The stack n, t is used to keep track of what variable named n of type t contains the returned value of a call to an internal method. The table AO records the correspondence between low-level names and types of objects that are dynamically allocated, either internally or externally. Entries of AO have form (v, t), where v is the low-level identifier of a dynamically allocated object o, and t are the interfaces implemented by o. Entries that are added to AO in the construction phase are entries of externally allocated objects. Conversely, entries that are added to AO in the execution phase are entries of internally allocated objects. The , s) , where c.m denotes method m of class c and s is the body of such a method. The code generated in construction and execution phase is added to this table, which is then used to generate the output of the algorithm. All of these data structures are initially empty, save for c.m that is initialised to Tester.main; i is set to 0 and diff to false.
The algorithm employs other data structures to keep track of static information of C 1 and C 2 . Table II contains all internal interfaces. Tables EM and IM contain all method signatures defined in external and internal interfaces respectively. Table SO contains the high-and low-level identifiers of all static objects.
The low-level value lifting function ↑(v, t) takes a low-level value v, a type t and returns a corresponding high-level value v of type t. This function is employed to obtain the high-level value corresponding to a low-level one. While the encoding for ground-typed values is straightforward, non ground-typed need to be retrieved from the lists that are kept in object oc.
Construction phase. This subroutine creates code to be added in MB for the entry related to m c based on the type of the actions under consideration. All generated code is added in the body of the following if statement:
. This is a call to a method m compiled at address a of object v with parameters v = v 0 , . . . , v j . Table IM tells that the method being called has signature m(x 0 : t 0 , . . . , x j : t j ) : t and it is defined in interface t . For all k from 0 to j the following code is added:
If t k is not ground nor internally defined, the following code is added, and an entry (v k , t) is pushed in AO, where t are all the interfaces t k implements.
Given a fresh name n, the following code is added, and (n, t) is pushed on n, t.
Then the execution phase subroutine is called on the following two actions of α 1 and α 2 . It will possibly return some code that needs to be added after the one just generated. Finally, an empty string is returned.
returnback ret(v)?. For an external method returning value v of type t, given a fresh name n, the following code is added:
If t is not ground nor internally defined, the following code is added, and an entry (v, t) is pushed in AO, where t are all the interfaces t implements.
Then the following code is added:
Then m c is popped from c.m and the execution phase subroutine is called on the following two actions of α 1 and α 2 . What is returned from the execution phase is returned from this phase.
Execution phase. α 1 (i) and α 2 (i) can be different actions or the same one.
Different actions, assume wlog
The subroutine adds the following code in MB for the entry related to m c .
The second line is added only if t is internally defined, in which case an entry of the form (v 1 , t) is added to AO, where t are the interfaces implemented by t. For all arguments v j ∈ v 1 with type t j where t j is internally defined, the following code is added after the comment in the previous code and an entry of the form (v j , t) is added to AO, where t are the interfaces implemented by t j . If the only difference is in the value of parameter x j of type t j , that has value v j in the first trace, three cases arise. In all of them the generated code is added to MB for the entry related to c.m 1 , where c is the class defining method m 1 . The following code is added in case t j is ground, internally or externally defined. If only one of the two low-level action α 1 (i) or α 2 (i) exists, then two cases arise (assume wlog that it is α 1 (i)). In this case the algorithm must only create the code that determines which component is under test, as it sets the diff flag to true so iteration over the traces will stop. return ret(v 1 )!. The subroutine returns the code:
callback call a(v, v)!. The subroutine adds the following code in MB for the entry related to c.m where m is the method corresponding to a and c is the class defining it, and returns an empty string. 
F Proofs
Notation. Indicate the i-th action of a trace a as a In Fig. 18 two low-level, even-numbered actions are the same by definition, as they are produced by the same external memory. The corresponding evennumbered, high-level actions are proven to be the same in Theorem 1 below. This C ↓ 2 Fig. 18 . Graphical representation of the proof scheme.
is because the algorithm outputs a component that replicates even numbered, low-level actions. Two low-level, odd-numbered actions may be different, in which case the corresponding high-level actions are different as stated in Assumption 1 below. What needs to be proven here is that the algorithm differentiates between the components generating those different traces.
In the proof, the algorithm receives two different low-level traces as input. This means that during the interaction between the compiled component and external memory, checks at entry points never terminate the execution. Property 1 (Low-level traces numbering). Given a low-level trace α, if actions in the trace are numbered starting from 0, then every even-numbered action is a call or returnback and every odd-numbered action is a return or a callback. ∀i ∈ N, α (2i) ∈ α ⇒ α (2i) = γ? and α (2i+1) ∈ α ⇒ α (2i+1) = γ!.
Proof. Straightforward induction on i.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. Can be found in [18] .
Proof of Theorem 1.
Proof. Since m is the same while interacting with C ↓ 1 and C ↓ 2 , the different action in α 1 and α 2 is found at an odd-numbered position. Moreover, by analysing the code generated in the construction phase of the algorithm, one can see that the generated component will perform high-level actions that are equal to the low-level ones. This means that there is at least one high-level trace in the trace semantics of C 1 and C 2 whose even-numbered actions are equivalent to the evennumbered actions of α 1 and α 2 . Call these traces a 1 and a 2 respectively. Thus ∀i ∈ N, a (2i) 1 ≡ a α (2i) 1 ; similarly for a 2 . As odd-numbered actions are generated by the compiled components, apply Assumption 1 to state that the corresponding high-level action will be equivalent to it. Thus: ∀i ∈ N, a ; similarly for a 2 . The execution phase of the algorithm generates code that distinguishes between C 1 and C 2 if they perform two different odd-numbered actions, a simple analysis of the execution phase code presented in Section E shows that.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. The if and only if is split in two subpoints. The direction ⇐ holds due to Assumption 1. The direction ⇒ is reversed to the equivalent statement: C 
G Benchmarking measurements
We have then taken a simple program and, using a hardware high-frequency timestamp, timed its performance in without any protection, in Fides and in Fides extended with the runtime checks provided by the security runtime. Table 2 below presents the overhead introduced by the secure compiler. The "Instruction" column indicates which operation have been tested. The security runtime adds checks to calls, callbacks, returns and returnbacks, so they are the only instructions that are considered. The "Normal" column indicates the cost of each operation without using the Fides architecture. The "Fides" column indicates the cost of each operation while using the Fides architecture without the secure compilation scheme. The "Prototype" indicates the cost of each operation when the secure compilation scheme is used in addition to Fides. The number following calls and callbacks indicates the number of arguments used and which trigger runtime checks. Each operation was performed 1000 times on a MacBook Pro with a 2.3 GHz Intel Core i5 processor and 4GB 1333MHz DDR3 RAM. The difference between the first two columns shows the already high overhead of adopting the Fides architecture. The difference between the third and fourth column is the overhead of the security checks introduced by the secure compiler. Security checks are triggered only when the boundary between the protected and the unprotected memory partitions is crossed. Method calls within the same memory partition suffer no overhead.
The overhead introduced by the compiler is proportional to the amount of boundaries crossing. Table 2 . Cost of different instructions and overhead of the secure compilation scheme.
